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The Battle of the Chinese Farm took place during October 15 to October 17, 1973 between the Egyptian Army and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), as part of the Yom Kippur War. It was fought in the Sinai Peninsula, north of the Great Bitter Lake and just east of the Suez Canal, near an Egyptian agricultural research station. The farm featured specialized Japanese-made machinery; Israeli soldiers mistook Japanese characters on this equipment for Chinese, leading to the area being labeled 'Chinese Farm' on Israeli military maps.〔Hammad (2002), p.311〕〔Dupuy (2002), pp.431, 493–494〕 The battle began when the IDF launched Operation Abiray-Lev ("Stouthearted Men"), attempting to establish a corridor to the canal and allow bridges to be laid for a crossing. Accordingly, the Israelis attacked Egyptian forces in and around the Chinese Farm. Determined Egyptian resistance made progress extremely slow for the Israelis, who suffered heavy losses. The Israelis were repeatedly reinforced with armor but were unable to make much headway, only managing to seize an important crossroad on the second day. Suffering from a lack of infantry, the Israelis brought up paratroopers during the night of October 16/17. They were tasked with clearing anti-tank defenses for the armor, but they became pinned down by heavy Egyptian fire. The paratroopers drew Egyptian attention long enough for the Israelis to move bridging equipment to the canal undetected. Armored forces later extricated the paratroopers. The Egyptians attempted to restore their defenses to their initial dispositions with an armored attack on October 17. It initially succeeded, but was pushed back by Israeli counterattacks in an armored battle lasting the entire day. Seriously depleted by the continuous fighting, the Egyptians relinquished control of the routes to the canal, opening them up to the Israelis. The battle is remembered as one of the most costly and brutal battles of the war. ==Background== On October 6, 1973, Egypt launched Operation Badr, intending to cross the Suez Canal and establish bridgeheads on the opposite bank of the Sinai Peninsula, which had been occupied by Israel since 1967. Coordinated with a Syrian assault on the Golan Heights, the crossing achieved tactical surprise and was a success. Thereafter, counterattacks by Israeli reserves were unsuccessful. By October 10, fighting along the front had come to a lull. The Egyptians dug in and hoped to wear down the Israelis by attrition, while remaining within range of their ground surface-to-air missiles, which provided air cover from the west bank of the canal, while the Israelis focused on directing their main efforts against the Syrians in the Golan and reorganizing their battered forces. Israeli failures led to the replacement of the chief of the Israeli Southern Command, Major General Shmuel Gonen, with Chaim Bar-Lev, although Gonen was retained as his aide.〔Hammad (2002), pp.85–200〕〔Gawrych (1996), pp.27–55〕 The situation changed when Sadat, in the face of protests from his senior commanders, ordered an offensive to seize the strategic Sinai mountain passes, hoping to relieve Israeli pressure on the Syrians. The resulting offensive was ill-planned and ill-executed, culminating in heavy Egyptian losses without achieving any of its objectives. This gave the Israelis the initiative to launch a counteroffensive.〔Hammad (2002), pp.237–276〕〔Gawrych (1996), pp.55–57〕〔Dupuy (2002), pp.485–490〕 On October 14, immediately following the Egyptian offensive, Israeli Chief of Staff David Elazar presented the general outlines of a crossing operation of the Suez Canal to the Israeli cabinet in a meeting in Tel Aviv. Elazar emphasized the military and political gains of the operation, and the expected collapse that would occur in the Egyptian forces on the east bank when their supply routes became threatened. Elazar received unanimous support from the cabinet. Later that day, Bar-Lev headed a meeting attended by the senior and main division commanders in the Sinai theatre: Major Generals Abraham Adan, Ariel Sharon and Kalman Magen. Bar-Lev informed the Israeli officers of the decision to begin the crossing operation on the night of October 15/16, and assigned duties and responsibilities to the division commanders.〔Hammad (2002), pp.293–294〕〔Gawrych (1996), p.59〕〔Dupuy (2002), p.490〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Battle of the Chinese Farm」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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